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Industrial policy
and development
Wilson Suzigan and João Furtado
This article examines some theoretical approaches in support of
industrial policy in Brazil, with special emphasis on the neo-
Schumpeterian/evolutionary approach. This approach is applied to the
analysis of some satisfactory experiences in the field of industrial policy
and economic development in Brazil up to the end of the 1970s, and
some unsuccessful attempts in this field from the 1980s on. Lastly, it
evaluates the industrial policy applied by the government in the 2003-
2006 period, noting that, in spite of some positive aspects –the emphasis
on innovation, clear goals and a new institutional organization– that policy
has some weak points, such as its incompatibility with macroeconomic
policy, lack of coherence between economic instruments, shortcomings
in infrastructure and in the science, technology and innovation system,
and lack of coordination and political will.
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I
Introduction
One of the most characteristic aspects of the lag in the
economic development and also, by extension, the
social development of Brazil has been the poor
performance of industry in the last 25 years. This reflects
the various problems faced since the 1980s in the
practical implementation of industrial policy.
Although some official documents on industrial policy
prepared between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s
were publicly announced, they did not come to be put
into effect, except for some programmes or policies
with specific objectives (reform and programmed
reduction of customs tariffs, temporary protection for
some industries, quality promotion programmes, etc.)
which were not sufficient in themselves to boost
industrial development.
In the present study, we seek to resume the debate on
industrial policy in Brazil in line with an approach which:
i) discusses the theoretical bases guiding the drafting and
implementation of this type of policy; ii) uses those bases
to explain in general terms the reasons for the positive
earlier experiences and the unsuccessful attempts to apply
industrial policy as from the 1980s, and iii) evaluates
present industrial, technological and foreign trade policy




The controversy on the definition and scope of
industrial policy is due largely to the different positions
regarding its theoretical bases. Some authors with a
liberal background resort to formal theories to justify
intervention through industrial policies as a way of
correcting market failures or imperfections – in such
matters as externalities, public goods, uncertainty,
insufficient or biased information, and so on – under
the hypothesis that the equilibrium of the economy is
less than optimal, and on the basis of assumptions on
the substantive rationality of agents behaving in a
maximizing manner, fixed industrial structures, and
knowledge available as a free good. According to this
point of view, industrial policy is of a purely reactive
and restricted nature, aimed specifically at correcting
imperfections in the market, and should be applied
horizontally: i.e., it would not be selective as regards
sectors or activities.1  Even so, intervention would only
be justified when its benefits were not less than its
costs in terms of government (or bureaucratic) failures
and rent-seeking.2
The neo-Schumpeterian authors and supporters of
evolutionary economics, however, while not rejecting
formal theories, base their views above all on rigorous
observation of economic phenomena, which
constitutes what Nelson and Winter (1982) call
appreciative theory.3  When combined with
An earlier version of this study was presented at the seminar
on political economy and Brazilian development, organized
by the Centre for Development and Regional Planning of the
Faculty of Economic Sciences of the Federal University of
Minas Gerais (CEDEPLAR/UFMG) and held at Belo Horizonte on
7-8 April 2005.
1 With a good deal of irony, Dosi (1988, p. 119) says with
regard to the normative model based on the idea of market
failures that “these ‘imperfections’ of the real world delimit the
domain of institutional intervention, which –it is claimed–
should make the world more similar to the theory”.
2 This argument is in opposition to the new institutional
economics of State intervention, which holds that the cost of
information is not specific to the government and that profit-
seeking is necessary in order to encourage innovation. For a
good summary of this debate, see Chang (1994, chapter I).
3 As described in the paper by Nelson (2004) and in the lecture
by the same author organized by the Office of the Rector of the
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), given at Campinas on
16 March 2005.
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Schumpeter’s views on the strategic role of innovation
in economic development and the formal theories of
evolutionary economics, this approach discards the
equilibrium hypothesis. In line with more realistic
assumptions that agents’ behaviour is based on limited
(or bounded) rationality and that knowledge is
predominantly tacit or idiosyncratic, the neo-
Schumpeterians hold that technologies, business and
industrial structures and institutions in the broad sense
–including institutions providing support for industry,
the infrastructure, standards and regulations– coevolve
, and that their motive force is innovation.4  According
to this theory, industrial policy should be active and
wide-ranging and should be aimed at industrial sectors
or activities which foment technological change and
at the economic and institutional environment as a
whole, which conditions the evolution of business and
industrial structures and the organization of
institutions, including the establishment of a national
innovation system. This determines the systemic
competitiveness of industry and promotes economic
development.5
This second approach is more suitable for the
formulation and implementation of an industrial policy
as a development strategy, and its broad scope implies
the need to make industrial policy compatible with
macroeconomic policy; to establish goals; to link
together instruments, rules and regulations in line with
the objectives set; to coordinate the progress of the
various infrastructures (physical, scientific,
technological, innovation-related and social) in
synergy with the industrial policy adopted, and to
organize the system of public institutions and
representative private-sector bodies which must
interact in order to put it into practice. Although the
need for such broad-ranging actions is evident in the
light of the fundamental bases of neo-Schumpeterian/
evolutionary theory, we nevertheless feel that it is
important to summarize the main points.
It is generally recognized that, as a result of the
management of the two basic prices of the economy
–interest rates and the exchange rate– and of the level
and structure of taxation, macroeconomic policy may
come into conflict with a development strategy based
on an industrial policy. It is not recognized to the same
extent, however, that the latter policy can also affect
macroeconomic objectives: for example, through
increases in productivity. It is important that industrial
policy should not become unviable as a result of very
restricted or unstable macroeconomic policies. As
Corden (1980, p. 183) says, “the more disturbance there
is on the macroeconomic side, the more industrial
policy is likely to become short-term oriented”.6  In
various senses, industrial policy is a bridge between
the present and the future, between existing structures
and institutions and those which are still in the process
of formation and development. Although it can be an
important instrument for combating uncertainty, this
cannot be eliminated altogether. If the macroeconomic
environment continues to be marked by very
pronounced instability, industrial policy will probably
lose much of its potential and vigour. When there is
uncertainty and basic indetermination about the
relatively distant future but the immediate situation
seems relatively stable, the structuring and transforming
dimensions of industrial policy lose importance in the
eyes of the agents, who concentrate above all on their
own short-term objectives.
Although the establishment of goals is
undoubtedly the most controversial aspect of industrial
policy and is the favourite target of its critics, it is of
fundamental importance in an industrial strategy
driven by innovation and guided by technological and
structural changes in firms and industries. The
detractors of industrial policy criticize in particular
interventions which involve the selection of “winners”
or a “winning industrial structure”, which corresponds
to a mistaken interpretation of the concept of industrial
policy. Such policy does not involve the replacement
of market mechanisms with bureaucratic decisions but,
on the contrary, is the result of “cooperative efforts by
the public and private sectors to understand the nature
of technological change and to anticipate its likely
economic effects”.7  The political scientist Chalmers
Johnson, whose classic study on Japanese industrial
4 See Nelson and Winter (1982), Possas (1996), Dosi (1988)
and Dosi and Kogut (1993).
5 With regard to the concept of systemic competitiveness and
industrial policy, see Possas (1996). This concept is also implicit
in the work by Fajnzylber (1990) on changing production
patterns with equity in Latin America.
6 Although Corden’s text (1980) corresponds to a specific period
and problem –the adoption of positive adjustment-oriented
industrial policies, as against purely defensive policies, in the
crisis which affected the level of employment in the developed
countries in the 1970s– his instructive analysis of the relations
between macroeconomic and industrial policies shows that there
are industrial policy ingredients in macroeconomic policy, that
the latter affects the objectives of industrial policy, and that in
turn industrial policy affects macroeconomic objectives.
7 See Johnson (1984, pp. 9-10) and also Rodrik (2004).
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policy8  was a notable contribution in the field, is
perfectly clear on the establishment of goals, asserting
that: “Government does not make these decisions so
much as ratify and underwrite them. Industrial policy
becomes a way to evaluate their economic as well as
their scientific significance. Targeting thus does not
mean the promotion of technologies that are unlikely
to develop at all on their own; it means, rather, helping
them rapidly to achieve the necessary economies of
scale and manufacturing efficiency without which they
can never become internationally competitive”
(Johnson, 1984, p. 10). Obviously, some of the goals
may turn out to be failures, but this is a risk which must
be run in all activities, in so far as they are subject to
uncertainty. The critics of industrial policy exploit the
fact that the failures are there for all to see, whereas it is
harder to prove with arguments that cases where good
results were obtained would not have been successful
without government support (Johnson, 1984, p. 10).
The success of industrial policy as a development
strategy centered on innovation also depends on the
difficult task of linking up instruments, rules and
regulations. It is these instruments for the
implementation of industrial policy which create the
patterns of economic signals, regulate the incentives
for and restrictions on innovation, and make it possible
to harmonize the activities of profit-seeking enterprises
with the objectives of industrial policy designed to
promote development and competitiveness.9  The aim
is to manage the various instruments –the system of
protection, financing, export promotion, fiscal
incentives, defence of competition, patents law, etc.–
in a harmonized way, without any ambiguities
regarding the signals given to the agents, and in
keeping with the objectives of the industrial strategy.
This can be of fundamental importance for the success
or failure of the strategy. Thus, for example,
contradictory movements of the exchange rate and
customs tariffs (or other instruments of the protection
system, including export promotion), financing which
is insufficient or has priorities different from those laid
down in the industrial policy, fiscal incentives with
objectives incompatible with those of industrial policy,
or legislation which gives rise to uncertainty on the
competitive environment and the possibility of making
use of the benefits of innovation, can all distort the
desired distributive effects and prevent the industrial
policy from acting as a development strategy.10
Another requisite for the success of the strategy is
to coordinate advances in the field of infrastructure
with the implementation of industrial policy, especially
when the strategy is one of technological catching-up.
Although infrastructures are great sources of
externalities, many critics and even some supporters
of the idea of industrial policy consider that
infrastructures are outside the ambit of such policy.11
As a development strategy, and above all because of
its emphasis on innovation, however, industrial policy
must necessarily include the infrastructures as a policy
variable. Dosi (1988) refers to the “organization of
externalities” and the “creation of context conditions”,
consisting of the provision of efficient economic
infrastructure services and the development of the
science, technology and innovation system so that it
not only includes training and research centres but also
institutions which establish a relation between
scientific and technological advances and their
economic exploitation by enterprises. The need to
organize the externalities of the economic
infrastructure is clear: it must be ensured that they really
are externalities and not external hindrances or
diseconomies for enterprises. The conditions regarding
the science, technology and innovation system are also
of fundamental importance for the innovation process.
No knowledge-intensive industry can grow without
the support of a solid training and research system and
various types of specific training (often the result of a
long learning process) and without the simultaneous
8 See Johnson (1982).
9 In a paradigmatic article in which he seeks to create a broad
policy framework within the neo-Schumpeterian/evolutionary
approach, Dosi (1988) suggests five variables on which policies
can act: the capabilities of the science and technology system,
the capabilities of the economic agents in the search for new
technologies and forms of organization, the patterns of
economic signals, the forms of market organization, and the
incentives, stimuli and constraints facing the agents in their
adjustment and innovative processes .
10 Dosi (1988, pp. 130-131) rejects Ricardian distributive
efficiency and asserts instead that the distributive options must
reflect the different technological opportunities associated with
different products and sectors, in order thus to attain what he
calls Schumpeterian efficiency, that is to say, technological
dynamism as an effect of the distribution model and the
efficiency of growth, i.e., “specialization in goods with high
income elasticity of demand”.
11 As, for example, Chang (1994, chapter 3), who considers
that broad definitions overload the concept of industrial policy
and prefers instead the usual definition of selective industrial
policies.
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development of the synergies, standards, models and
regulations typical of its institutional complexity.12
Lastly, and because of all the foregoing, institutional
organization in the strict sense is indispensable for
putting industrial policy into effect. On the one hand,
coordinating or executive public institutions must be
established, while on the other hand it is necessary that
there should be bodies representative of the enterprises
or other interest groups involved. The organization of
the first-named must be flexible and responsive and must
be linked up and coherent with the objectives of
industrial policy. This means that these institutions
cannot be run in line with the interests of the bureaucrats
working in the corresponding area, nor can they be
swayed by special interests (Chang, 1994, chapter 1;
Rodrik, 2004, section III). The bodies representing
enterprises and other interests must be legitimated and
recognized as suitable interlocutors in policy
formulation and implementation.
This debate touches on two central aspects of any
strategy based on industrial policy: political power and
coordination. In turn, the political aspect is divided into
two main points. Firstly, and above all else, the adoption
of an industrial policy as a development strategy must be
the subject of a political decision. This is what Johnson
(1984, p. 7) means to say when he asserts that industrial
policy is above all an attitude, and only afterwards a
technical question. Secondly, the strategy must be headed
by an indisputable political authority. Rodrik (2004,
pp. 19-20) suggests that it should be headed by a minister,
the Vice-President, or even the President of the Republic.
This would thus place industrial policy at the summit of
economic policy, ensure the necessary links between the
executing institutions, and make possible better
coordination of activities.
The other aspect refers to the coordination which
is an essential element of industrial policy, as distinct
from the decentralized coordination carried out by the
market mechanisms. In the latter case, the measures
applied through industrial policy would be a form of
ex post coordination, in response to market failures or
imperfections. This normative model, however, does
not take into account the phenomena characteristic of
the dynamic world of technological evolution, in which
“lato sensu institutional factors appear to shape the
constitution of behavioural rules, learning processes,
and patterns of environmental selection, the context
conditions under which economic mechanisms operate
–in general, and a fortiori with reference to
technological change” (Dosi, 1988, p. 138).
Consequently, according to the neo-Schumpeterian/
evolutionary approach, industrial policy is seen
essentially as a form of ex ante coordination.
Two important observations may be made regarding
this form of coordination through industrial policy:
firstly, this is a form of strategic collaboration between
the government, enterprises and private sector entities
in the light of the objectives of industrial policy, rather
than coordination centralized at the level of the State.13
Secondly, it involves the creation of specific institutions,
in the form of collegiate bodies, as consultative,
deliberative and decision-making agencies. Rodrik
(2004), for example, suggests that these institutions
should be public/private bodies structured as
coordination and deliberation councils organized at the
national, regional and sectoral levels. Although this
author –in line with the industrial policy approach
adopted– proposes that such councils should be places
for the exchange of information and social learning, the
complexity of the dynamic world described by Dosi
(1988) makes it necessary for them to have a more
ambitious mission and to function in effect as channels
for the interaction of public-private activities and the
formulation and implementation of a development
strategy focused on industry and innovation.
Dosi (1988) considers that a strategy of this type
makes it possible to modify the systems of comparative
advantages which are determined endogenously by the
evolution of international markets and –perhaps even
more important– it can set in motion a learning process
which can boost economic and social development.14
12 Among the most common examples of this are the electronics
industry and its synergies with telecommunications,
information-processing equipment, transport equipment and
consumer durables; the pharmaceutical industry, especially as
regards its main assets, with their solid scientific basis and their
relations with the health system, and the aircraft construction
industry, with its technical safety standards.
13 Or, as Rodrik (2004) suggests, with a view to solving problems
identified by those actors in the productive sector of the
economy. This approach is a compromise between industrial
policy guided by market failures and that which places the
emphasis on innovation, in that it proposes that the government
and the private sector should interact to identify problems and
find solutions to them.
14 With regard to the industrial policy applied in Japan after the
war, which is seen as a showcase example of success in change
and development, Dosi (1988, p. 142) says that “One decade
after the end of the Second World War, no economist would
have suggested that electronics was one of the Japanese
comparative advantages. Now it certainly is. If one would have
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Unlike what neoclassical theory claims, development
is not the pure and simple result of the accumulation
of physical and human capital, but also, and above all,
the result of learning new technologies and how to
master them.15  Nelson (2004) says that technological
updating calls for innovation, and the capacity for
innovation involves adopting and mastering ways of
doing things which have already been in use for some
time in the advanced economies but which are new for
the country or region which is trying to “catch up”.
III
Brazilian industrial policy
in the recent past
There seems to be no doubt that the rapid
industrialization of Brazil in the period between the
end of the war and the end of the 1970s was propelled
by industrial policies. In that period, industrialization
became an accepted part of the political agenda and
economic policy, some political actors were
strengthened, and other new ones arose –industrial
associations, unions of employers and workers, and
regional and sectoral bodies– while economic policy
reflected the new political setting. Nationalist
developmentalism and State intervention prevailed,
bringing together the political forces and the economic
interests of the industrialization project. The decision
in favour of industrial policy and the manifestation of
political leadership were reflected in particular in two
events: the plan to attain a series of goals adopted under
the Kubitschek government and implemented by
industry-level executive groups with the participation
of the private sector, and –under the dictatorship– the
implementation of the second National Development
Plan under the authoritative direction of the Economic
Development Council. At the same time, however,
albeit intermittently, there was a corresponding process
of evolution of technologies, economic structures and
institutions throughout the period in question.
The goals pursued were established above all in the
light of balance of payments problems: import
substitution and, in the 1970s, an increase in the export
of manufactures. In this sense, industrial policy was mainly
concerned with building up sectors so as to make the
industrial structure converge with the structural model of
the industrialized economies, based on the engineering
and chemical industries.16  At the same time, efforts were
made to create a national innovation system –the National
Scientific and Technological Development System–
and to improve the economic infrastructure, first in the
areas of energy and transport, and later of
telecommunications.17  The firm establishment of the
industrial structure and the infrastructure led to the
taken the relative allocative efficiency of the different industrial
sectors thirty years ago as the ground for normative
prescriptions, Japan would still probably be exporting silk ties.
In a sense, the use of comparative-advantage criteria as the
final and sole ground for normative prescriptions is a luxury
that only countries on the technological frontier can afford
(…)”.
15 Nelson and Pack (1999) analyse these learning processes on
the basis of what they call “assimilation theory”, in contrast
with “accumulation theory”. See Kim and Nelson (2005,
Introduction) and Nelson (2004).
16 These two industries accounted for between two-thirds and
three-quarters of the output of the most highly industrialized
countries (Germany, the United States and Japan). Next came
France and Italy (with a proportion of around three-fifths),
while in Brazil the proportion was slightly over 50%.
17 The pioneering institutions of the National Scientific and
Technological Development System were the National Council
for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and the
Coordination for the Enhancement of the Capability of High-
Level Personnel (CAPES), set up in the early 1950s. The
Technical and Scientific Development Fund (FUNTEC) of the
National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and
the Fund for the Financing of Studies and Projects (FINEP) were
formed in the 1960s. Subsequently, research and post-graduate
training in the universities was structured and measures were
taken to set up research and development institutes and centres
in State enterprises, together with specialized laboratories and
other research institutions, including some in the field of
agriculture, which were the origin of those now considered to
be examples of success in the international market. In those
days, however, there was not yet proper interaction with the
productive sectors, and this is still considered to be insufficient
even today.
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organization of the economic power around the well-
known triple axis of the State (infrastructure and basic
industries), foreign capital (fast-growing industries) and
domestic capital (traditional industries and some
segments of the fast-growing industries).
Throughout this period there was also an ongoing
process of institution-building. The State improved its
facilities in terms of organization and economic
coordination by creating planning bodies, programmes
of goals or sectoral plans, institutions and policies in
the areas of public finance, promotion and foreign
trade, specific norms and regulations on prices, public
utility service charges, wages, economic concentration,
technology transfer and foreign direct investment,
among others. The coordination of this institutional
machinery and the respective instruments was
somewhat deficient, however. Throughout the period
there was indiscriminate and excessive tariff protection,
equally indiscriminate provision of fiscal and financial
subsidies, tardy emphasis on exports, insufficient
attention to training for innovation, and serious
regulatory distortions affecting investments, prices,
public utility charges and wages. Something similar
occurred with macroeconomic policy: although this
was openly expansive, except in the first few years of
the dictatorship, it allowed various discriminatory
exchange rate regimes, often with subsidies for imports
and penalization of exports, until the system of mini-
devaluations was adopted. Likewise, the tax structure
was archaic and strongly regressive, and interest rates
contained subsidies that kept the private financial
system in a state of under-development, at least until
monetary correction of financial assets was adopted.
Even so, industrialization and economic growth
gathered pace and began to change the pattern of
international insertion of the country, which ceased to be
merely a supplier of agricultural and agroindustrial
commodities and gained increasing importance as a
supplier of manufactures and semi-manufactures. This was
not reflected in social improvements, however, and on
the contrary, social problems got worse. The concentration
of the population –a phenomenon inherent in the process
of industrialization – increased in urban areas, but there
was no concomitant change in the educational system
and the training and skills of the labour force. Because of
this and of the weakening of the trade unions, real wages
went down and there was a deterioration in income
distribution, which favours current growth but is
extremely bad for the future of the country.
It might be considered that the right moment to
reform the industrial policy model was the transition
from the 1970s to the 1980s. The emphasis on the
construction of sectors should have been reduced, the
end of import substitution as an industrialization
process should have been acknowledged, and more
qualitative goals should have been set, aimed at
promoting innovation, technological development,
quality and productivity.18  Such changes began to be
considered when there was an attempt to reform foreign
trade and fiscal incentive policies in 1979. Efforts to
outline a policy for the development of industries
representative of the new information technologies
began with the creation of the Special Secretariat for
Informatics, which gave rise to the Informatics Act,
promulgated in October 1984.19  The process was cut
short, however, by changes in the authorities
responsible for running the economy at the end of 1979
and by the macroeconomic crisis of the early 1980s.
Thus, instead of the hoped-for changes, as from 1981
the historical process was reversed, so that technologies
and business, industrial and institutional structures in
the broad sense (including the corresponding policies)
ceased to evolve and even fell back, the infrastructures
deteriorated, and the National Scientific and
Technological Development System was abandoned.20
In the political and economic policy field,
developmentalism and State intervention lost ground
and the power and leadership exerted up to 1979 by the
Economic Development Council, albeit in an
authoritarian manner, were weakened. In the Federal
Government, there was no longer an attitude favouring
industrial policy and, on the contrary, macroeconomic
stabilization objectives now prevailed. From then on,
stabilization policy, monetary policy objectives, and
the exchange rate policy of the real prevailed over
considerations of industry and the productive sector as
a whole, making industrial policy unviable. The various
attempts to formulate and apply an industrial policy
were frustrated or only partially implemented.21
18 In the 1970s import substitution as a source of industrial
output growth was already less important (8.3%) than the
expansion of exports (14.4%). The dynamism observed was
due to domestic demand (77.3%). See IPEA (1985, p. 209).
19 For a summary of the first measures proposed, see Suzigan (1979).
20
 Between 1979 and 1984 the resources of the National Scientific
and Technological Development Fund were cut by more than
two-thirds.
21
 These attempts were made late in 1984 and early in 1985
(after the election of the “New Republic” administration); in
1988, during the Sarney administration (the New Industrial
Policy); at the beginning of the Collor administration (the
Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy – PICE), and at the beginning
of the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995).
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All forms of coordination were abandoned. The
sequence of plans for economic, scientific and
technological development was interrupted, and sectoral
goals and programmes were deactivated. The policy
instruments which had previously helped to promote
industrialization began to be administered in line with
the objectives of macroeconomic stabilization. Up to
the end of the 1980s, non-tariff barriers restricted access
to imports even more than before. Some exports were
subsidized, public investment in infrastructure was
reduced, public budgets for financing industry and for
the National Scientific and Technological Development
System were drastically slashed, development incentives
were reduced, and controls on prices and public utility
charges were made tighter. There were some timid signals
of change between 1988 and 1989 as a result of tariff
system reform, but this finally proved to be meaningless
because the prevailing protection was due to non-tariff
barriers and new incentives for investment and
technological development established under the New
Industrial Policy. Meanwhile, the failure of the
stabilization policy designed to cope with inflation put
paid to any hopes of resuming industrial development.
The 1990s brought major changes, both good and
bad. Although industrial development occupied a place
in economic policy once again for a while, the attempt
to implement an industrial policy within the framework
of the Collor Plan failed, and the only element of the
Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy (PICE) actually
implemented was the liberalization of foreign trade.
The multilateral trade agreements signed within the
ambit of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
subsequent revaluation of the real completed the trade
liberalization process. In addition, there was greater
openness to foreign direct investment and the State
ceased to act as an industrial development agent. The
industrial promotion system was abandoned, and a
broad process of privatization of enterprises and
infrastructure was begun. This radically changed the
economic environment and exposed industry –already
weakened by many years of stagnation– to the
predatory competition of imports and foreign
investments. As a result, there were intense de-
nationalization processes, conflicts between the State
and employers’ organizations, strong sectoral
pressures for protection (from the automotive sector,
for example), a crisis of federalism, due to the individual
states’ policies designed to attract investments to fill
the gaps left by industrial policy, sluggishness of
industry, which was struggling to adapt to the new
context, rising unemployment, and a weakening of the
trade unions. Currency stabilization caused marked
economic instability –especially at the external level–
and greater uncertainty and risks, due to the volatility
of exchange and interest rates and the predominance
of the financial sector over the productive sector. All
this consequently gave rise to a vicious circle.
Industry carried out a drastic adjustment process.
Firms reduced their operational structures and sought
to improve the quality of their products, to increase
productivity and to direct their activities towards
exports, while production structures were reduced
through the dismantling of chains of production
–especially in the electronics, capital goods and
chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors– and the
deactivation of high-technology segments. The share
of manufacturing in the gross domestic product (GDP)
went down by several percentage points. A new power
structure emerged, made up of a regulatory State, the
predominance of foreign capital in some industries
which were of strategic importance from the
technological development standpoint, and domestic
private groups which had been restructured but had
only limited financial capacity and few production
synergies, especially as regards new technologies.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the country was
still without an industrial policy, and any attempts to
adopt political decisions to formulate and implement
such a policy came up against various obstacles:
(i) It was necessary to overcome the ideological bias
against industrial policy which had grown up after
years of predominance of neoliberal economic
thinking, which had installed itself largely
because of the exhaustion of the old intervention
models typical of the import substitution phase.
(ii) Macroeconomic policy (interest and exchange
rates, tax structure) should be less insensitive to
industrial development aspects and less hostile to
the need to take measures for the promotion of
industry.
(iii) The institutional organization of the public sector
was not effective for the promotion of industrial
development, since it had changed very little with
respect to the previous normative model and its
interactions with the private sector were very
limited and subject to discussions in outdated
sectoral chambers and forums on competitiveness
which had no real influence.
(iv) Public financing of investments in industry was
limited by budget cuts and by the emphasis that
the National Economic and Social Development
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Bank placed on privatization operations and those
of a primarily financial nature.
(v) The National Scientific and Technological
Development System had been weakened by years
of budget cuts, despite the revitalization brought
about by the Sectoral Funds as from 2001-2002.
(vi) There were no links between policy instruments
in the fields of foreign trade (within the new
framework of multilateral trade agreements and
regional economic integration accords), fiscal
incentives (federal, state, regional and sectoral),
and competition and regulation.
(vii) After many years of cuts in public investment, and
in spite of the privatization operations, the
economic infrastructure had seriously deteriorated,
and there were cases of inefficiency that generated
negative externalities for firms.
(viii)Social problems had worsened: there was growing
unemployment (especially in metropolitan areas),
increased poverty (only momentarily relieved by
the Plan Real in 1994-1995), worsening income
distribution, crises in the public health and social
security systems, and the educational system was
lagging behind what was desirable in a democratic
and republican society in the age of information
and communication technologies.
These were the circumstances conditioning the
industrial policy option at the beginning of 2003, and
it was in this framework that the present Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) was
formulated and implemented. In the following section,




and Foreign Trade Policy as a
Development Policy
The implementation of PITCE at the end of 2003 is a
positive event in itself, because it shows that the
authorities thus finally overcame –at least in part– the
bias against industrial policy which had prevailed for
so long, and also because it shows that there was a
political decision in that sense, even though we are
still far from solving the wide range of problems raised
by a development policy which is industry-centered,
innovation-driven, and guided by technological and
structural changes in firms and industries, in line with
the neo-Schumpeterian/evolutionary approach. What
is notable is that industrial policy once again came to
occupy a place on the political and economic policy
agenda.
In addition to some virtues, however, PITCE has many
defects which make it hard for it to operate as a
development policy. Its virtues include its goals, the
emphasis on innovation and, to a certain extent, its
recognition of the need for a new form of institutional
organization to put policy coordination into effect. Its
defects are due to its incompatibility with
macroeconomic policy (especially as regards interest
rates and the tax structure), the lack of links among the
instruments involved and between those instruments
and the demands of enterprises, the precarious nature
of the infrastructure, the shortcomings in the science,
technology and innovation system, and the fragility
of the way the industrial policy process is run and
coordinated. The following sections give a brief
summary of these points.
22
 We do not aim to make a formal presentation of the Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy here or to evaluate its
practical application. For updated information on the measures
and programmes involved, see the document by the Ministry
of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC, undated).
The newspaper Valor Econômico published a series of five
reports on industrial policy, by the journalist Ricardo Balthazar,
which include data and opinions that will help to understand
the context of PITCE.
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1. PITCE: its goals, and its emphasis on innovation
and on a new form of institutional organization
As mentioned earlier, industrial policy is essentially a
means for the coordination of strategic actions of the
government and enterprises with the aim of developing
activities that induce technological change or solve
problems identified by those actors in the productive
sector of the economy. This policy is not limited to the
traditional industrial sector, as shown by some activities
in which Brazil has reached international
competitiveness, such as agribusiness and aircraft
construction. The creation of the Brazilian Agricultural
Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) and its interaction with
enterprises in the agricultural sector, and the
establishment of the Institute of Aeronautical
Technology, which gave rise to the Brazilian Aircraft
Corporation (EMBRAER), may be considered as typical
industrial policy actions. The focus on industry is
undoubtedly the most important aspect, however,
because industry traditionally comprises most of the
sectors that spread innovation and technical progress.
Part of the innovations and production advances that
many sectors manage to attain is incorporated in
machinery and equipment, which, together with inputs
of different characteristics and qualities, provides the
means of development for so many activities. The
services sectors also make a considerable contribution
to change and development in many economic
activities. Many of these services arose in industry,
where they grew into autonomous activities classified
under the general heading of “services”. The
informatics sector and software-related activities are
the most obvious example of the way in which services
perfect industrial processes and allow them to reach
degrees of sophistication unimaginable under
conventional methods. Consequently, industrial policy
must necessarily be of broad scope, and it may be said
that it is not just a policy for industry but also a policy
for structuring, restructuring, improving and
developing economic activities and the process of
generation of wealth in general. If industry is the hub
of that policy, it is because of its capacity to cause the
effects to spread to the economic system as a whole.
In this sense, the selection of the activities which
are to be the subject of industrial policy is strategic
and must be the outcome of collaboration between the
government and enterprises. The owners of enterprises,
more than anyone else, know how to identify
opportunities, but because of uncertainty about the
expected profitability, they are often not willing to
run risks: in this case, government support is of
fundamental importance, and industrial policy is the
most suitable form of coordination. Both these actors
must collaborate within the framework of PITCE to
identify the opportunities for change that the sectors
generating technical progress offer to the rest of the
economy.
It must be borne in mind, however, that there are
now many more restrictions on the application of
industrial policy than in the past. These are due to
multilateral and regional trade and economic
integration agreements; to the participation of big
domestic and foreign enterprises which enjoy greater
freedom of action and are less subject to the “dictates”
of the State and public policies; to the macroeconomic
policies themselves, and to the reduced willingness of
society to bear the costs of policies, especially when
they affect consumption and reduce the purchasing
power of individuals and families or the
competitiveness of the other enterprises.
All this does not represent a total impediment to
the application of an industrial policy, however. In the
case of international commitments, industrial policy
can still be applied by using the arms provided by the
agreements themselves, as for example in the case of
the measures adopted by the Brazilian government
within the context of the WTO to combat United States
subsidies and other unfair trade practices. Moreover,
as well as being even more necessary than in the past,
the current policies are different and have more
ambitious objectives in qualitative terms. Whereas
before they were limited to the promotion of specific
sectors, now they have much more qualitative and
refined objectives: building up sectors and guiding
them in particular directions is no longer the only way
of ensuring that the policies are sustainable.
The differences compared with the past are very
marked. Industrial policies and policies aimed at the
overall development of Brazil were combined for half
a century, and both of them were highly successful:
they produced a diversified and integrated industrial
system which was almost complete in terms of its
components, and they led to extraordinarily high
growth rates of GDP, income and employment. There
came a time, however, when they ceased to be
functional, and efforts are now being made to restore
this lost functionality through the present Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy. The aim is
not to put into place a new industrial structure but to
endow the existing one with renewed and sustainable
vigour.
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This movement towards new objectives is largely
dependent on the definition of a common vision, shared
by the actors in the economic process and their public
interlocutors. The construction of this common approach
must necessarily be a gradual and ongoing process. It
calls, among other things, for close collaboration, the
exchange of information, the establishment of mixed
forums, the continuity of its participants, the explicit
and deliberate expression of points of divergence, and a
determined search for convergence and the definition
of the successive steps to be taken. It is a gradual process
whose main result will be the firm establishment of a
climate of mutual confidence and respect. Governments,
ministries, public institutions and government agencies,
on the one hand, and firms, business associations, trade
unions, federations and confederations, on the other,
have essential objectives which are not identical but
can undoubtedly be combined to achieve results in
keeping with the missions of each of them, which are
different but compatible and complementary.
The main restrictions on the formulation and
implementation of an industrial policy do not come
from the outside but from within. The problem is not
so much to know if the WTO allows or forbids a particular
measure, but to find alternatives which are acceptable
to Brazilian society within the available international
space (which diplomacy is seeking to expand). Let us
take the example of one of the biggest successes of
Brazilian industrial policy in the twentieth century:
EMBRAER. Up to the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s,
this was still considered by many to be a company that
was somewhere between downright failure and dubious
success. To some, it was yet another of those abortive
initiatives that Brazil persisted in taking, running
counter to what was really needed and wasting
opportunities. This criticism is now totally unjustified,
however, and the silence of those who made it (who
even seek to avoid being identified with their previous
positions) is very understandable. The success of
EMBRAER in the 1990s has both recent and more remote
antecedents. The most recent date back to the 1950s,
when the institution for training high-level personnel
in this sector was formed, while the more distant
antecedents go back to the 1920s and 1930s, when the
main theses on Brazil’s needs and possibilities in the
aircraft industry were formulated. There was no less
than half a century between the initial seeds and their
fruits: a period in which substantial resources enriched
the fertile ground of ideas and capabilities until finally
aircraft became an important item in the country’s
export pattern.
Would such an enormous Brazilian success, which
restored our self-esteem and widened the range of
opportunities and prospects, be possible today? Would
we be willing to wait so long, without interrupting our
efforts and investments, until the time came to harvest
the fruits of our endeavours? The most likely answer
to both these questions is “no”. For this reason, we
must temper the policies we wish to implement with
the necessary doses of realism that society imposes on
us. The eventual costs of an industrial policy must be
measured against less distant benefits. In addition to
the costs –which are generally easy to see– society
must also be aware of the possible benefits of such a
policy –which are generally not immediate– and its
indirect effects, which are often forgotten. How much
of the present prosperity of the Vale do Paraíba is due
to the transfers of technology and human capital made
by the Institute of Aeronautical Technology (ITA) and
EMBRAER?
For these reasons, the orientation of industrial
policies towards new objectives, which began in the
last few months of the administration of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso with the establishment of the
Sectoral Funds and the proposed Innovation Act and
was consolidated with the Industrial, Technological
and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) in the first few months
of the present administration, may be considered a
positive event. Excessive emphasis ceased to be placed
on the trade balance, especially in terms of import
substitution, and export promotion gradually gained
ground as a trade promotion policy, together with a
tendency to pay more attention to diplomacy (of which
the understanding with China is the clearest example).
Quite rightly, and especially through the Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy, the emphasis
was placed on innovation and technological
development; sectors which help to spread technology
and innovations (capital goods, software and
semiconductors) were selected in order to extend the
new solutions to the economy as a whole, and not just
to industry in the strict sense, and two areas considered
to “hold the key to the future” were defined as priorities
for national scientific and technological development.
It is well known that innovation is much more than
just technological development, but the latter is
nevertheless the main source of innovations and the
only one which never dries up.
The sectors on which the Industrial, Technological
and Foreign Trade Policy mainly concentrates are
largely complementary and reflect the move towards
more contemporary objectives. The capital goods,
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software and semiconductors sectors are pervasive,
since they affect both industry and the economy as a
whole, and are ultimately of great importance for the
productivity of the other sectors of industry, the primary
and tertiary sectors and public services. In all three of
these, there were heavy trade deficits which still persist
even now. As already noted, capital goods incorporate
technical progress and provide the other sectors with
possibilities of change and development. The same
can be said of semiconductors and software.
A sound trade balance must be a permanent
objective of economic policy, and industrial policy is
a powerful tool for attaining this goal. There is a
fundamental difference, however, between seeking a
trade surplus by any available means and doing so on
the basis of the selected sectors. Let us take the case of
capital goods. Everywhere in the world, but above all
in the countries which are most advanced in industry
and technology, these goods account for the major part
of trade flows in both absolute and relative terms
(compared with total output or consumption, for
example). While the United States has a deficit,
Germany and Japan have surpluses in this respect. All
the advanced countries import large amounts of some
capital goods and smaller amounts of many other
goods. Capital goods mark a lasting commitment of
firms with their future and incorporate much of their
strategies. Properly chosen purchases will result in
positive long-term prospects, whereas the opposite will
be true in the case of unwise acquisitions. It is for this
reason that firms usually give special attention to this
point.
Developing a competent and dynamic capital
goods sector must be one of the objectives of any
development policy, but the reasons for this go far
beyond those connected with the trade balance. The
capital goods sector establishes close links with its
main clients and users. Manufacturers listen to and
check out the needs of their customers and seek to
develop new attributes which will meet the latter’s
demands. They do not do so out of an unselfish desire
to collaborate, but because of their need to gain the
best possible position vis-à-vis their competitors. In
this sense, having a well-qualified capital goods sector
acts as a guarantee for covering needs. Gaining access
to foreign markets and identifying the changes in
clients’ demands (whether present or potential) is more
important than taking special measures to encourage
the substitution of specific imports at a given moment.
For this reason, the change of emphasis of industrial
policy from import substitution to the formation of
capabilities and areas of competence is both healthy
and promising.
The new institutional organization created in order
to implement the Industrial, Technological and Foreign
Trade Policy may also be considered positive in some
respects. As noted earlier, having a flexible and
responsive form of institutional organization, with
strong political management whose leadership is
widely recognized, deliberative collegiate bodies, and
properly linked executive institutions is of vital
importance. It is well known that in Brazil there are
executive institutions which are effective in the fields
of finance (the National Economic and Social
Development Bank – BNDES); support for research and
development activities and innovation (the Ministry
of Science and Technology, the Agency for the
Financing of Studies and Projects – FINEP, the Sectoral
Funds, and state foundations for supporting research);
trade promotion and export development (the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the Agency for Export and
Investment Promotion – APEX), and others, but there are
few linkages between them and, above all, few links
between the instruments adopted and the needs of
firms. An even more important problem is that political
management and the capacity for coordination –which
are basic functions of industrial policy par excellence–
are rendered more difficult by the organizational
superstructure and the bureaucratization of decision-
making.
The establishment of an agency for linking
instruments and means (the Brazilian Industrial
Development Agency (ABDI), which was officially
implemented in February 2005 together with the
National Industrial Development Council (CNDI)), is a
favourable element. The CNDI is presided by the
Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade,
and is made up of 12 ministers, the president of BNDES,
and representatives of the private sector and of the
workers. In theory, this structure should help to improve
linkages and make possible better coordination. As it
was set up as an autonomous social service forming
part of System S,23  however, ABDI has no power to force
other institutions to collaborate with it, and it had
difficulty in forming its board of management, which
is made up of representatives of the ministries of
23
 System S, set up in accordance with article 149 of the
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, is made up of
11 institutions with specific sources of income deriving from
the social security payroll contributions paid by firms. Most of
the institutions are bodies providing social services.
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Finance, Planning, Budget and Management, and
Science and Technology.
2. The weak points of the Industrial, Technological
and Foreign Trade Policy
The implementation of this policy has been made more
difficult by the adverse effects of macroeconomic
policy, the lack of linkages among the instruments
adopted and between them and the demands of firms,
the precarious nature of the economic infrastructure,
the shortcomings in the science, technology and
innovation system, and the fragility of the way the
industrial policy process is run and coordinated. These
problems will be briefly analysed below.
The adverse effects of macroeconomic policy on
industry are well known and include, among others,
the use of the base interest rate as the main or even the
only instrument for controlling inflation under the
system of goals. The repercussions on the cost of capital
are also well known: finance for current production
flows and marketing is made more expensive, and
investments in the productive sector are discouraged.
This policy also implies great exchange rate volatility
under the floating exchange rate system and –more
recently– the revaluation of the real, cancelling out
the efforts at export promotion made under the
Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy.
Furthermore, there are the effects of tax policy, which
call for some more detailed remarks.
The fiscal aspect, which does not always come up
in the discussions on industrial policy (and on the PITCE),
needs to be clearly visible. We do not intend to repeat
here the criticisms which are always levelled at high
taxes. The State and the government turned a deaf ear
to these criticisms and paid the price of this
insensitivity in having to adopt Provisional Measure
No. 232, which provided for a number of incentives
for productive activities (and especially for
investments).24
The equality of all citizens before the law and
fiscal rationality are the main factors to be taken into
account. Quite apart from the actual level of the present
fiscal burden, which might be considered high by those
who pay their taxes in full, the tax burden and structure
have some characteristics which are very harmful for
any policy that seeks to promote efficiency and
competitiveness. The more the authorities delay in
correcting this irrational structure, the more difficult
the transition will be, because the resumption of
investments in industry –which follows a natural course
but is speeded up by industrial policy– promotes a
form of location of industry which adapts to the
prevailing fiscal irrationality but is uneconomic in all
other aspects. The desire to take advantage of some
fiscal loopholes, possibly connected with
inefficiencies in the tax enforcement structure, leads
some businessmen to take investment decisions which
would be untenable in other circumstances. Two of
these decisions which are quite common concern
location and scale of operations.
The location of some firms is sometimes decided
on the basis of fiscal advantages, which may be real, or
may be created through procedures which are either
frankly irregular or are typical of a “grey area”. For this
reason, some ventures become structurally dependent
on advantages stemming from a lack of fiscal equality,
which should be corrected without delay.
The problem of scale is just as important as that of
location. Incentives which are necessary and desirable
for small firms must not be confused with turning a
blind eye to irregular fiscal and labour practices.
Industrial location based on specious advantages
and unsuitable scales of production are sources of
fragility for the other firms and sectors involved, and
sometimes they also affect the competitiveness of
sectors situated upstream or downstream of the
respective production chains. Modern industrial
policies try to encourage and induce firms to adopt
different forms of behaviour that promote more rational
use of natural resources and the products made from
them and ongoing upgrading of labour skills. By their
very nature, these gains are incremental, except in just
a few cases such as “radical” innovations, which are
rare. How can we turn innovation into a collective and
self-sustaining form of behaviour if loopholes that
permit unfair competition nullify a large part of the
genuine efforts made? Recognition of the fundamental
role of small and medium-sized enterprises in creating
jobs, increasing employment and forming business
skills must on no account be confused with turning a
blind eye to irregularities. If support policy for small
and medium-sized enterprises is really intended to
support them, even more vigorous instruments than
those currently existing must be established, but
without ever confusing support with the toleration of
24
 Provisional Measures are a kind of legislative decree
originating from the Executive which make it possible to
delineate the limits and judicial mandates of the Legislature.
This type of measure has been frequently and increasingly
used since the early 1990s.
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tax evasion or laxity and labour irregularities. From
this point of view, the bureaucracy connected with
business ventures in general and enforcement in
particular is just as serious a problem for micro-, small
and medium-sized enterprises as the tax burden itself.
Industrial policy, which seeks to promote investment
and development, is sidelined by the fiscal dimension,
which largely opposes or weakens its effects. In other
words, industrial policy is weakened by tax policy, or,
rather, the lack of a real tax policy. Some advances25
are possible in both these fields and should form part
of the political and economic agenda, with industrial
policy as development policy.
Perhaps the most serious and important problem
that hampers the application of the Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy is the lack of
linkages of the mechanisms and instruments and the
lack of coordination with their beneficiaries. In the
present study we have tried to show that this policy
benefits small sectors which do not have the power of
entrainment of other economic sectors or segments,
and it is therefore more difficult for it to become a
development policy (the only sector with this
characteristic is capital goods, but it is restricted by
the adverse effects of macroeconomic policy on
investments in the productive sector). The selection of
three of the four sectors which warrant priority action
is very positive, however.
The role that the small sectors can play as
important vectors of a growth and development policy
does not consist of influencing industry and the
economy through their volume, but of providing the
other sectors with renewable means for increasing their
productivity and differentiating their products. It is
not a question of quantity, but of quality.
In order for this to happen, it is essential to link up
the capacity of the priority sectors of industrial policy
to supply products and services with the demands of
the other sectors and activities. In other words, in order
to promote growth and development on the basis of
the selected sectors, links must be established between
supply and demand, capacities and needs, and solutions
and problems.
For example: there are hundreds of thousands of
firms in all sectors, and especially those of the Local
Production Arrangements or localized production
systems, which could benefit from software developed
to meet their special needs in terms of modern
integrated business management. In this case, industrial
policy must provide these firms with the credit
resources needed in order for the production sector to
set itself in motion and deal with their needs, which
exist potentially but are not materialized because of
the lack of linkages.
The bodies that represent industry could take a
concrete initiative and link up the interests of the
software producers with those of the organizations
representing the firms in the Local Production
Arrangements. The public authorities could finance a
system for providing basic business management
software for small and medium-sized enterprises by
offering non-repayable resources from the National
Scientific and Technological Development Fund, the
Sectoral Funds, or the Informatics Act. This system
would make it possible to provide small and medium-
sized enterprises with management improvement
programmes and business management software in a
coordinated manner. The main aim of the programme
would be not so much to reduce costs as to provide
firms with an efficient cost management system suited
to their level of development. With the financial
resources linked with industrial policy (Sectoral Funds
or funds under the modified Informatics Act), the
various local production systems could develop
applications specific to their needs based on the basic
generic module, protected by modest property rights
(along the lines of common rights).26
The coordination of industrial policy mechanisms
and instruments, which are essential links in the
relations with their beneficiaries and a necessary
condition for industrial policy to function as an
effective development policy, is usually of dubious
quality, however. In the absence of the financial
resources and taxation capacity that industrial policy
was given in the past (not only in Brazil but also all
over the world, and especially in Asia), the efficacy of
the policy will depend on the harmonization of
interests and coordination on the strategic and
operational levels. This brings us to the question of
the discussion and evaluation of the institutional
problems associated with industrial policy
implementation (headed by the Brazilian Industrial
Development Agency): a delicate matter which is far
from being completely settled.
25
 Such as those achieved through the tax relief measures
forming part of the Social Integration Programme/Contribution
for the Financing of Social Security (PIS/COFINS).
26
 Forms of industrial or intellectual property rights which are
midway between the traditional absolute and rigid protection
and what is known as free software.
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One of the biggest difficulties of the Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy and indeed of
any present-day industrial policy is the view that its
own main actors have of it, which is usually not devoid
of stigmas and prejudices. The oft-repeated phrase “when
I hear industrial policy mentioned, I put my hand on my
pocket to protect my money” sums up this general view.
Although many of the main arguments in favour of
industrial policy are based on solid facts and
explanations, they do not manage, explicitly or
implicitly, to refute a number of the arguments against
such policy once and for all. Close collaboration
between private firms and public bodies –which is of
fundamental importance for the achievement of the goals
set and their broad application– is an indispensable
ingredient of such policies. Far from being a source of
corruption, it is a way of ensuring the regular and
systematic follow-up of policy formulation and
implementation, and when there is full visibility and
transparency, it actually serves as an antidote against
corruption. Industrial policy coordination depends
precisely on the existence of close relations between
the actors. The coordination and results of the process
are largely conditioned by the image those actors have
of the legitimacy of their intentions and roles.
Other problems which affect the economy in
general but can impede the success of the Industrial,
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy in particular
are connected with the obvious shortcomings in the
physical infrastructure (energy, transport,
communications, ports). Despite some recent advances,
the development of the national innovation system is
still insufficient for a strategy like that of the PITCE.
Although the advances made thanks to the Sectoral
Funds and the prospects for the effective functioning
of the Innovation Act are undeniable, other problems
persist such as the insufficiency of the budgetary
resources for the Ministry of Science and Technology
and the Fund for the Financing of Studies and Projects,
the weakening of the public universities, research
organizations and laboratories, and the lack of
adaptation of the educational system to the needs of a
development strategy which emphasizes innovation
and respects the rights of citizens.27
The infrastructural problems are long-standing and
reflect the macroeconomic restrictions – especially of a
fiscal nature – which have historically affected public
investments. They also show that the privatization
operations and the new management model based on
concessions for the provision of services under public
regulation and the control of regulatory agencies have
not worked as expected. It is now considered that public-
private partnerships are the best –if not the only–
possibility for securing the resumption of investment in
this area. According to Monteiro (2005), however, this
form of public action suffers from “great complexity,
because of its economic, political, constitutional,
organizational, administrative and accounting
aspects”, so that that author comes to the conclusion
that “the best way to strengthen the establishment of
public-private partnerships is to improve the
deliberative quality of the national political process,
which would enable the public actors to understand
the demands of the population as citizens, electors and
taxpayers at least as well as private enterprise
understands the realities of its consumer market”
(Monteiro, 2005, p. 24). The fact that the public-private
partnerships will be under a Board of Management brings
us to the general problem of the political mandate and
coordination of the Industrial, Technological and
Foreign Trade Policy.
In reality, the biggest impediment to the effective
implementation of the PITCE as a development policy
derives from the difficulty it will have in fulfilling the
role that a policy of this type must carry out par
excellence: the ex ante coordination of concerted
actions by public and private actors. The political line
of command is vague: although the Minister of
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade presides over
the new National Industrial Development Council,
linked to the Office of the President of the Republic,
his political leadership is watered down in the
extensive range of deliberative bodies of the same or
higher level. These include the Economic and Social
Development Council, the Council of Government, the
Economic Policy Chamber (presided by the Minister
of Finance), the Economic Development Policy
Chamber (presided by the Minister in charge of the
Casa Civil), the Governing Council for Public-Private
Partnerships, and the Inter-Ministerial Council on Local
Production Arrangements. The faculties of the Brazilian
Industrial Development Agency –PITCE’s executive
arm– are limited, and its ability to use the policy
mechanisms and instruments adopted depends on a
complex network of relations with other ministries
–some of which are more powerful than it is– and
relatively autonomous institutions such as BNDES and
the Agency for the Financing of Studies and Projects
27
 The present budgetary constraints imposed on EMBRAPA are
eloquent in this respect.
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(FINEP). This deliberative superstructure and the division
of powers hamper the legitimization of leadership, hold
up the taking of decisions on industrial policy, and
impede the linking-up of instruments and the
coordination of actions in line with the needs of firms.
In view of all these difficulties, it is understandable
that Rodrik (2004) suggested that the industrial policy
process should be directed by the President of the
Republic himself or by a Minister of State with powers
delegated by the President.
V
Final remarks
The Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade
Policy, and industrial policies in general, will not be
able to act as the panacea they might have been in the
past. We say “might have been” because many of their
defects and the ostracism they have suffered are due to
past excesses which we might call, with a little
exaggeration but not without some cause, “caprices of
omnipotence”.
In order to be effective, industrial policy must be
ambitious but prudent. It must be conceived as an
instrument for change and development, yet without
demanding unlimited amounts of scarce resources.
Emphasis must be placed on the objectives of the
industrial policy and on the mobilization of the main
actors in economic life and in public and private
institutions in order to be able to carry out the immense
tasks of coordination involved. In a macroeconomic
regime characterized by severe restrictions, but in which
firms have shown their great dynamism and public and
private institutions have always acted creatively, it is
vital that the Industrial, Technological and Foreign
Trade Policy should take advantage of the available
business and institutional skills in order to create the
intricate architecture of coordination. This is a
challenge calling for persistence, gradual and patient
building on achievements, follow-up, review and
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